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TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES-

THE NEW

GAME IN FORECASTING:
SHOULD OUR DISCLOSURE APPARATUS
CO-OPT THE ANALYST'S CRYSTAL BALL?
GEOFFREY T. CimLmmRs-l
"Be not the first by whom the new are try'd
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside."
Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism
Interested observers of the regulatory scene cannot fail to be struck
industry efforts "to reevaluate where and what the obligations
recent
by
are"'-with respect to predictive analysis. These efforts come at a time of
upheaval. The concept of self-regulated markets under full disclosure
is everywhere under fire. Drastic structural changes are suddenly proposed and reluctantly agreed upon to preserve investor confidence.
In this heady atmosphere of regulatory frenzy one now hears a
simple, direct proposal: The SEC should require an issuer to make
public its own forecasts as to future earnings. 2 This proposal, though
simple enough to state, marks an historic turning point in the philosophy of securities regulation with implications not yet fully understood.
To date, with minor exceptions, issuers must promptly and accurately
tell the public only what they have done; the most they can do for an
investor is to accurately summarize past history; in general, statements
as to what they can or will do are regarded as qualitative evaluations,
manipulative per se.3 Now it is implied that these statements are not
a Member

New York Bar.
Addresses by William J. Casey, Chairman of SEC to: The Conference Board, Nov.
18, 1971; The N.Y. State Bar Association, Jan., 1972; The Assoc. of the Bar of the City of
N.Y., April 80, 1972. See also Levenson, The Role of the SEC as a Consumer Protection
Agency, 27 Bus. LAwYEm 61, 62, 69 (1971); STATEMENT OF THE SEcurrms AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES MARKErs 35 (1972).
2 Indeed, the Interstate Commerce Commission required, effective June 10, 1972, that
all applications to issue new securities under §§ 20(a) or 214 of the Interstate Commerce
Act (equivalent to § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933) be accompanied by the issuer's pro
forma income statement and cash flow statement for the ensuing 12 months. This would
become a matter of public record. Ex Parte Order No. 275, 840 I.C.C. 817 (1972), 37 F.R.
7160. See Backer, Reporting Profit Expectations, 53 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 33 (1972);
Daily, The Feasibility of Reporting Forecasted Information, 46 ACCOUNTING Ray. 686 (1971);
Willingham, Smith & Taylor, Should the CPA's Opinion Be Extended to Include Forecast?,
88 FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE 80 (1970); Solomon, Pro Forma Statements, Projections and the
SEC, 24 Bus. LAWYER 889 (1969); Statement of George Doriot, summarized in Wrong
Remedy?, FoRBEs, Apr. 15, 1972, at 30.
3 See Securities Act Release No. 3-5180 [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 78,192 (Aug. 16, 1971).
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inherently manipulative; on the contrary they are items of information
as material to investors as the past record.
The proposal represents a forthright response to a nagging dilemma
with which securities regulators perceive themselves to confront in
recent years: either force issuers to risk fraud liabilities in order
to get disclosure of their projected results or so deprive investors
of an essential element of decision-making that the entire disclosure
system reduces to an irrelevant burden. The proposal simply chooses
the former alternative, directly arousing the resistance of issuers, accountants, lawyers and others.
In discussing the proposal, it will be most useful to define a "forecast" as any language describing a future state of affairs, however general. Also one should avoid confusing (i) the factual element, i.e., that
the issuer has, in fact, issued a forecast which it expects to meet and
(ii) the judgmental element, i.e., that the forecast implies some conclu.
sory assessment of the company's investment worth.
Those who advocate the new proposal usually employ a combination of the following arguments:
1. The making of an informal ("judgmental") forecast of an
issuer's future earnings is a critical preliminary to a good investment decision (buy, hold, sell, vote) with respect to an
equity security, since price movements are positively related
to earnings results over time.
2. Privileged (i.e., insider, institutional or professional) investors
should not have the exclusive right to develop and use "inside"
("factual") forecasts for themselves with the aid of the issuer,
as they now do, since this invariably tends to injure the fairness and credibility of the securities markets.
3. Issuers are the best equipped and motivated of all possible
sources to produce earnings forecasts useful to investors.
4. Management accountability for performance can be furthered
through matching forecasts with actual results.
5. The accounting profession is able to accept responsibility for
the reasonableness of forecasts, if a credibility check is needed.
Underlying the foregoing propositions are several assumptions.
A basic one is, of course, that the regulatory framework ought to
promote dissemination of "material" information to investors as the
fairest, most efficient means of policing the markets. 4 Another is that
4 See id.; "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most effiBRANDmis, Ormm PEoPLE's MoNEY 211 (1914); H.R. REP. No. 138,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934), S. REP. No. 1455, 78d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1984).

dent policeman." L.
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there is an "average investor" who is capable of evaluating any investment decision on his own, if only he is provided with "material"
information necessary to that decision.5 Here the notion is that the
disclosure objectives are achieved by eliminating complexity, 6 and by
pointing out "material" pitfalls7 to this average investor. A third is
that "material" information is in fact - or can be - actually directly
disseminated to all investors in time to affect the relevant decisions.8
A fourth is that the degree of price and volume variances in trading of
an equity security can be directly and negatively related to the degree
of adequacy of public disclosure about that security. 9 Excessive market
fluctuations are seen as failures of disclosure regulation. A fifth is that
issuers are themselves favorably disposed to publish forecasts which are
meaningful to investors. 10 Further research is said to be in progress to
elucidate these matters.:"
The foregoing arguments, and assumptions, if valid, support what
will amount in the end to a revolution in securities regulation. Some
observations do emerge, however, on examining some of the foregoing
arguments and assumptions. In particular:
1. The notion that investment decisions as to equity securities
are based largely on a projection of future earnings of the
issuer is of recent origin and is not universally accepted as
effective for all equity securities.2
5 Levenson, supra note 1, at 68.
6 See Securities Act Release No. 5119, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fm. SEc. L.
REP.

77,939 (Dec. 16, 1970) (clarification of prospectuses).

7 See Securities Act Release No. 5012, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FE.
77,748 (Oct. 9, 1969) (disclosure of information).
REP.

SEc. L

8 Sowards, The Wheat Report and Reform of Federal Security Regulation, 23 VAND.
L. REv. 495 (1970) [hereinafter Sowards].
9 See Levenson, supra note 1, at 62; S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1963).
10 See Backer, supra note 2. The article is based on interviews with financial executives
of 70 companies under the auspices of the National Association of Accountants, indicating
that 32.8% of companies visited publicly disclosed profit expectations from three months
to a year in advance, another 39.6% regularly communicated with analysts as to the
accuracy of their estimates and half of the executives queried (no indication as to companies) were in favor of some form of mandatory yearly forecast. See also Daily, supra note
2 (concluding on the basis of his interviews, that firms would not voluntarily report detailed forecasts).
11 "I think the challenge the whole investment community faces is how it can provide
the kind of guidance and professionalization of information, advice and judgment which
will keep the small guy in the investment markets. I think that the whole question of
money management and the investor's relationship with brokers is going to be carefully
scrutinized. I just don't know what the final answer will be." W. J. Casey, quoted in
FoRmBs, July 15, 1971, at 17. See also note 67 infra.
12 At the conclusion of a penetrating analysis of price-earnings data of 178 companies,
1961-65, sponsored by the Institute for Quantitative Research in Finance, Burton G. Malkiel and John G. Cragg recently pointed out that while their system could be said to
explain 45-65% of uncorrelated variance in price-earnings ratios from year to year, on the
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2. There is not, at present, a demonstrably accurate method
acceptable to theorists or analysts, for relating projections of
future achievable earnings of issuers to the future market
13
values of their equity securities with any degree of accuracy.
3. Traded price levels of equity securities can themselves be
regarded as projections of future values "prepared" by investors; thus, the trading of securities can really be said to be
the purchase and sale of future securities values as affected by
present information, or "information futures".14
4. We may be talking about apples and oranges when we talk
about the need to give issuer forecasts to investors. The process
of preparing an earnings forecast is normally seen by issuers
as part of planning and budgeting under management accountability programs; it is questionable whether a securities analyst
or sophisticated investor will see the process the same way for
purposes of preparing estimates of future securities values; 15
basis of published earnings predictions of 19 investment firms, the system was relatively
useless in identifying "underpriced" securities. The authors speculate that the old Keynes'
"beauty contest effect" is at work, i.e., you pick the newspaper beauty contest winner by
choosing the entrant that the other contestants are likely to believe average opinion would
consider the prettiest. Malkiel and Cragg, Expectations and the Structure of Share Prices,
60 AM. ECoN. REv. 601 (1970). For a popular report of this study, see N.Y. Times, Mar. 11,
1972, at 37, col. 4. For a similar conclusion, as to earnings, based on a study of 12 firms,
see Daily, supra note 2. The Daily study noted that while most of the firms could project
revenues out five years with a 10% margin of error, one third of the firms had a 15% or
greater error margin in projecting net income. See also discussion of English experience,
notes 52-39 infra; Mascia, Corporate Earnings Predictions, 25 FINANCIAL ANALYsTs J. 107,
110 (1969): "Once again, the general observation was made that a careful, painstaking forecasting procedure does not seem to be worthwhile in terms of hoping for better results.
Thus, the concept of 'normalized' earnings seems to be a good one; Keenan, Models of
Equity Valuation, the Great SERM Bubble, 25 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 243 (1970);"
BELLMORE & RrrCHE, INEsrmNTs, ch. 14 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter BtLasoRE]; GRAHAMW,
DODD AND CorrLE, SEcURrrY ANALYSIS 31 (4th ed. 1962) [hereinafter GRAHAM]; J. BOGEN,
FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 7 (4th ed. 1964) [hereinafter BOGEN]; Supplement to FRIEND & BLUME,
wHAIRTON INSITUMIONAL INVsrOR STUy (1970), reported in N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1972, at
49, col. 5.
13 See Keenan, supra note 12. See also, Whitehurst, The Predictabilityof Investor Cash
Return from HistoricalIncome Trends of Common Stocks, 45 ACCOUNTING Rvimw 553
(1970).
14 See Malkiel & Cragg, supra note 12.
ID See Harvey Kapnick, Chairman, Arthur Anderson & Co., Statement on Financial
Forecasts and the Role of the Independent Accountant, SEC "Hot Issues" Hearings, (File
No. 4-148), March 22, 1972 at 3:
While financial statements should assist the investor in assessing the future, interpretations of the future, based in part on information provided by financial
statements, must be the responsibility of the investor. . . . The question of
separation of an investment judgment, with its corresponding risks and rewards,
from the reporting of financial transactions and facts is subtle but important.
Information as to management's profit goals, budgetary constraints and plans, or
other expectations, may be useful to investors; however, such information is just
that- expectation and not fact- and should not be treated in such a way that
it acquires a status inconsistent with its true reliability . . .
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management's own forecast may be helpful as a "factual"
forecast but it is not necessarily as responsive as "judgmental"
forecasts to external factors such as how the company will
stand up to competition, etc.
5. It is not clear that simplifying the document will necessarily
produce better decisions on the part of the small investor.,,
6. Given the system, the "average" investor may simply be
physically incapable of responding to forecast information in
time to translate it into profit; thus, recent analyses of the
source of trading volume indicate that response to value
changes has increasingly been the province of institutions
rather than individuals. 17
One may well summarize the point of view of the proposal as
follows: (i) an earnings forecast is in most cases essential to an investor
decision; (ii) earnings forecasts by management are the ones on which
investors are most likely to rely; and (iii) forecasts will be most reliable
if management is responsible for them in the first instance. The
observations made above tend to call into question this point of view
and set the tone of this inquiry.
Accordingly, I propose first to discuss some philosophical questions,
note the importance of carefully analyzing the informational context
and thereafter make an alternative proposal which should meet some
of the problems in that context. Lastly, I will make some observations
on the state of the securities laws in this area and the position of
securities analysts and accountants.
Some Philosophical Questions
Regulatory systems should promote a continual review of the legal
concepts which they fundamentally use, to ensure flexible conformity
to the felt needs of the time. Fundamental to our system is the concept
of immediate disclosure of "material fact". The system defines certain
See also statement of John Gearhart, Director of Investor Relations, Singer Company, in
Metz, Market Place, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1972 at 48, col. 2. He states in part: "The artful
analyst . . . wants to know the company's shifting competitive position and how the

management is reacting to the shift. That's the essence of it. He may even be ahead of
management." See also BELrmoRE ; GRAHAM; BoGEN, supranote 12.
16 Georgeson and Company, an investor relations firm, recently studied investor response to annual reports. The study concluded that the average small stockholder spent
a bit less than 15 minutes looking at a report. N.Y. Times, March 5, 1972, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
See also Wrong Remedy?, FoRBns, Apr. 15, 1972, at 30.
17 See Institutional Investor Study Report of the SEC to the U.S. Congress, Chapters
X-XIII (1971). Conceivably, this response could well be the result of increasing institutional professionalism in the rapid translation of data into precise estimates of securities

values,
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fact as "material" per se, such as current capital structure, and certain
fact as "material" in context, such as a new contract.
Those who constructed the system were aware that business
efficiency is promoted by access to relevant information, because business efficiency is in large part the result of allowing control over
business assets to move to those with superior ability to make sense
out of information. Compensations and rewards in the form of increased profits and control over resources come to organizations which
regularly grasp the implications of what they see before others and
can act upon their perceptions. Society as a whole is said to benefit from
a system which protects this process.
Now we have a proposal to shift the focus of the concept away
from the factual and toward the conclusory. Forecasts prepared by
the issuer are to become "material" per se (they are already, to a certain
extent, "material" in context as indicated below), because to do otherwise would be to deprive the investment decision-making process
of protection which it needs in order to remain an efficient allocator of
resources. This is because allowing unregulated access to forecasts
permits investment organizations to buy success in making sense out
of information. This undercuts the rational allocation of economic
power which is the proud boast of our "free market" system.
There is, however, a tautology in the foregoing chain of reasoning,
however laudable its objectives. If successful forecasting is the badge
of investor performance, asking issuers to make forecasts makes them,
in effect, high-performance investors. An unavoidable logic puts issuers
in direct competition with investors in the race to interpret information
for investment purposes. Before we had investment organizations
"buying" success. Now issuers are to be "selling" it. Both, I suggest,
are to be avoided.
A possible solution to the problem may develop if we examine
more closely what it is we are trying to protect. I submit that the shift
in investor access to information which gives rise to this debate over
forecasts is really not as qualitative as one would expect; that what is
"bought" by institutions in each case is not really the conclusory forecast but varieties of factual "advance" information. This information
is perhaps not significant, separately considered, but, taken as a whole,
is highly significant to an understanding of the future.' The public,
by and large, sees "lagging" and "coincident" indicators of issuer
IS See

Why Security Analysts Irk Management, BusiN ss WEEK Nov. 6, 1971, at 96:

"Management's most common complaint is that analysts keep driving for more and more
detailed numbers."
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results. The "lead" indicators, while just as factual, remain safely
locked in the analyst's files.
If a security is an "information future" then its present value to
an investor will always be related to the degree of factual basis for his
estimate of that "future". The probabilities associated with predictions
are, in the average situation, as important as the predictions themselves.
I suspect that what we are talking about is not the suppressing
of ultimate conclusions but the absence of "ultimate fact". The defendant's car hit a tree; the jury will probably decide he was negligent,
and that's all the professionals will tell us, till the verdict proves them
right or wrong. We should, in all fairness, learn if the defendant was
consciously in control of the car, if we are to make up our minds for
ourselves.
To be concrete about it, analysts are generally able to extract the
categories of "lead time" or "ultimate" factual information about
issuers listed below, among others, well in advance of the public.
Possibly we should be doing battle with issuers over whether they
should disclose these facts, rather than speculating as to whether they
should make predictions. Such categories might include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Monthly trend of promotional expense
Monthly trend of new orders by product line
Monthly sales by product line
Monthly cash budget by product line
Monthly collection rates on receivables
Monthly age on average payables
Current working capital position
Current "break even" sales rate by product line
Monthly trend of orders for inventory components by product
or inventory category
10. Current orders for capital equipment, options to buy real
estate, etc.
11. Current trend of product liability claims, redemptions or
cancellations, etc.
12. Current "per unit" cost and productivity data
Doubtless every securities analyst has his own favorite list of this
type of information, which is an essential basis for his forecast, and
he's always trying to pry it loose.
Should the fruits of predictive securities analysis be legitimized or
co-opted by the regulatory system? If I am correct, the answer is a
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partial "yes", to the extent they present "ultimate facts" or "lead
indicators" of issuer performance.
The current move by the SEC to require issuer cash flow and
budgeting statements in prospectuses of new issues is a move in the
direction of factual disclosure which should bring us closer to this
objective. 19
What, then, is the most efficient way to get this factual information
out in the marketplace? I believe that procedural solutions which
cause the parties to bring about the chosen state themselves are far
more desirable than a set of substantive rules. The procedural is
generally easier to understand, cheaper to interpret and enforce, and
more widely complied with than the substantive. One treble damage
action is worth a thousand administrative proceedings. A study of the
informational context of disclosure should indicate the way to a procedural solution.
The Informational Contexts
The assumption is that we are encouraging not speculation, but
investment based on sound securities analysis. Analyzing a security has
never been considered an easy task.20 Yet the history of our securities
laws is in part the history of an ongoing debate between those who
21
favor complex thoroughness and advocates of direct simplification.
Simplicity is said to aid the "average" investor in grasping the significance of what he is being told, while a mass of detail is an easy mask
for deceit. 22 Others argue that no "average" investor makes - or should
make - his own decisions and the quantity, quality and presentation
of disclosure should be pitched to the eye of the "reasonable" pro23
fessional.
There is little prospect that the debate ever will be resolved,
because, like most chronic debates, it arises in part from perceptual
discontinuities. The "simplifiers" see the informational context as
one in which there are few intermediaries in the information flow from
disseminator to decision-maker. Therefore, the responsibility for a
simple conclusory impact should rest on the disseminator of the
information. The "complicators" see the process as one of filtration
19 See Securities Act Release Nos. 5274-79, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
78,905 (Jul. 26, 1972). See also Statement of Financial Analysts Federation,
L. RE'.
Budget Forecasts in First OperatingProspectuses,SEC "Hot Issues" Hearings, May 5, 1972.
20 See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934).
21 See SEC DiscLosuR POLICY STUDY 51-52 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WHEAT REPORT].
22 Sowards, supra note 8.
23 See Backer, supra note 2.
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through intermediaries, some or all of whom should take up the
simplifying task. Neither group is completely willing to concede that
the regulatory needs of the context may vary; that it is not homogeneous as to objectives, timing or consequence.
The appearance of projections on the scene may, however, usefully serve to sharpen the focus of debate. A requirement to disseminate projections moves us inevitably in the direction of simple,
conclusory disclosure and away from the murk of detail. Yet, as I have
argued, it is not fitting in any informational context now regulated
for an issuer to project its earnings, though issuers should produce
more "ultimate fact". Therefore, it would certainly appear useful to
inquire whether, for all informational contexts now regulated, placing
on some intermediary the regular burden of disseminating projections
would (i) serve as a useful procedural device to force issuers to disclose
"ultimate fact" to the public, (ii) remove an undesirable advantage
now held by some investors in decision-making and (iii) promote the
right degree of conclusory simplicity for the "average" investor.
In what regulated informational contexts are projections clearly
important? It can be argued 24 that projections are important from
the minute an investor looks at the security as a possible buy to the
minute he has sold it - in short as long as it is traded. Under any
theoretical scheme, the projected value of a security changes every
minute; practical considerations make it impossible for anyone to put
out projections at that rate. As things stand now, we are looking at
basically three types of informational contexts (see Appendix A):
1. A "distribution" context, where quantities of a security are
being heavily sold.
2. A "corporate action" context where votes or exchanges of
securities are being solicited.
3. A "trading" context, where the relative merits of various
securities are being discussed or promoted.
It is noteworthy that what we are dealing with in this case is
accuracy and velocity. Information must be most accurate. Information
must be most rapidly propelled to the furthest reaches of the system.
Now in each context we have information being generated and
disseminated by different people, different ways and for different
purposes and we have a different mix of decisions being made by
24 See Gonedes, Some Evidence on Investor Actions and Accounting Messages (pts.
1-2), 46 AccoUNTING REviEw 320, 535 (1971), arguing that the "transformational strategies"

formulated by investors do not respond to publication of annual reports in any identifiable way which affects stock prices. See also, Malkiel & Cragg, supra note 12.
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different persons, based in part on the information. Again, the object is
to structure (1) substantive requirements as to types of predictive
information, (2) procedural requirements as to flow and (3) allocation
of responsibility for accuracy and velocity so as to achieve the most
effect with the least regulatory effort.
As indicated in the Wheat Report 25 our focus has, in recent years,
switched from concern over 1933 Act "distributions" to concern with
1934 Act "disclosures". Well it might. While the annual volume of
new equity issues has jumped from approximately $500 million in
1935 to $2.5 billion in 1970,26 annual exchange trading volume of
equities has jumped from $15 billion to $170 billion.27 Public shareholders jumped from 6.4 million in 1952 to 26.4 million in 1968.28
Our vast equities markets in this country are, by and large, run by
professionals bound by business and legal duties to standards of care
in the sale of securities. Thus, we are faced with more elusive, complex
problems than the simple frauds going about in the 1930's. For every
Bank of Sark29 there are a dozen Wrigleys.3 0
The new proposal to have issuers publish forecasts does not really
solve the regulatory dilemma; it merely worsens its effect. Furthermore,
it does not easily fit within the context of a smoothly unfolding policy
responsive to the entire informational context; it is too "1933 Act"
oriented.
If responsibility for the judgmental (as distinct from the factual)
element in forecasts is placed on independent experts we may directly
avoid the dilemma. Fraud liabilities can still be imposed on issuers for
failure to disclose facts material to forecasts; responsibility for errors
or professional judgment in forecasts will rest on the experts. Further,
development of standards for outside experts can carry over into 1934
Act "trading" contexts where issuers may not be directly involved.
An Alternative Proposal
In view of the foregoing, it would seem to me reasonable to
require the presence of forecasts prepared pursuant to substantive
requirements in "distribution" and "corporate action" contexts, where
a certain amount of legitimized selling takes place, during a period
25 WHEAT REPORT,

79

supra note 21, at 49. See also Cohen, Truth in Securities Revisited,

HA v. L. REv. 1340 (1966).
26 See WbHEAT REPor, Appendix
27 Id.

H1-1.

28 Id. at 47.
29 See Wall Street Journal, May 25, 1971, at 1.
30 See BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 6, 1971, at 96. See also BARRON's, Nov. 1, 1971, at 15; N.Y.
Times, March 80, 1972, at 55 (suits against Bausch & Lomb re forecasts).
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"fixed in time" as to values, via prospectuses and proxy statements.
It would not seem to me reasonable to impose detailed substantive
requirements in "trading" contexts, where the emphasis is on providing
the investor with somewhat less precise, but more current, valuation
data. Here, the forecaster should be expected to be more sensitive to
ongoing developments and to apply more professional judgment in
issuing and updating predictions.
It would seem to me reasonable to require the persons doing
the selling (i.e., the issuer, underwriter, tender offer or proxy soliciting
group) in a "distribution" or "corporate action" context to obtain and
distribute through normal disclosure channels (prospectuses, proxy
statements or other disclosure statements) a concisely worded predictive
statement prepared by an independent expert. The statement should
be required, since otherwise only favorable projections will be furnished. We have a precedent in the engineers' reports required in oil
and gas or other mineral offerings, where the wording is fairly severely
policed by the staff. Possibly the expert should not be the company's
independent public accountant (see discussion below). In the "trading"
context, one might want to encourage NASD members to make a
similar type of forecast, as of a specified recent date, available to buyercustomers.3 1
The predictive statement should be dated, indicate that it represents an independent professional judgment based on assumptions,
indicate how long it can be relied on and be prefaced by a summary
of assumptions upon which the expert relies. The assumptions should
follow some generally recognized format such as that used in England
(see discussion below). To the extent they constitute "lead indicator"
data on the company and its plans underlying the factual element of
the forecast, the assumptions should be furnished by, and be the
responsibility of, the party disseminating the document and both the
document and the predictive statement should so indicate. To the
extent the assumptions come from outside sources (e.g., general economic data) responsibility for their accuracy and adequacy should rest
with the expert.
It would be desirable to emphasize that no forecast under the
system should be presented without an estimate of its probability.
Further, comparisons of past actual with forecasted performance should
be set forth, where available. These, and a number of other more
technical procedural devices, should make it quite difficult for people
311 am aware of the complex compensation issues involved, currently under debate.
Fus'RE STRuaruREs, supra note 1. Unfortunately, there is not enough room
in this article to cover the matter in adequate detail.
STATEMENT ON
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to obtain or promote forecasts to which no reasonable basis can be
assigned. For example, it may be wise to prohibit statements by persons
connected with market makers, investment bankers or other categories
of interested parties.
A special financial analysis unit within the SEC could work with
independent professionals to develop self-regulated procedures for
generating forecasts, advise the Commission as to new policy questions
and interpret difficult cases. The unit would, of course, work closely
with the SEC Division of Market Regulations, the NASD and the
Exchanges to integrate the new approach with the present system of
brokerage house recommendations.
The burden of responsibility for velocity of forecast information
would rest on the sellers in a "distribution" or "corporate action"
context, and might be allocated between the NASD members and the
analysts in the "trading" context.
The foregoing alternate proposal should be distinguished from
similar proposals which would have the company prepare the forecast
and the independent expert verify the reasonableness of the underlying assumptions in a manner similar to the British system (see
below). 3 2 I do not believe that these proposals would really solve the
regulatory dilemma as set forth in this article and they would probably
complicate allocation of responsibility between the issuer and the
independent expert. Like the initial proposal, they do not look toward
a coordinated disclosure policy over the entire informational context.
Referring back to prior discussion of issuer responsibility for
"ultimate fact", I submit that the foregoing procedural approach to
complex disclosures in forecasting will force issuers to give out a multitude of advance data to parties eminently qualified to evaluate it and
bound by law to make that evaluation public as quickly as possible.
In the never-ending debate between "simplifiers" and "complicators"
we will have good answers for both sides: quick, simple recommendations publicly available to all "average" investors, plus additional
detail publicly available for evaluation by professionals.
The British Experience
It is worthwhile examining the British experience in this connection. Profit forecasts for the current year prepared by management
have long been included in documents describing capital issues on
82 See Statement by Sprague, Diggins and Ireland, Incorporated on the Public Disclosure of Earnings Projectionsand the Professional Evaluation Thereof, SEC "Hot Issues"
Hearings, May 23, 1972 (File No. 4-148); statement by Certified Projections Co., March 29,
1972. See also Parker, A Professional's Thoughts-Needed Information, 24 Bus. LAwiYR
63 (1968).
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the London Market. 33 It appears that such forecasts are generally
conservative matched against actual results. 34 As of May 1, 1969, there
was constituted by the Bank of England a City Working Party for
the purpose of considering good business practices in the conduct of
takeovers and mergers, and on that date the Working Party, composed
of members of the banking and securities industries, issued the City
Code on takeovers and mergers and provided for a Panel on Takeovers and Mergers to enforce it. Among other things, the Code was
designed to counter pressures on managements to issue irresponsible
profit forecasts in connection with a takeover battle. Rule 16 of the
Code does not require the generation of profit forecasts; however any
profit forecasts contained in any document addressed to shareholders
in connection with an offer (i) must be compiled by the Directors
"whose sole responsibility they are", (ii) must contain a statement of
the assumptions on which the forecasts are based, and (iii) must have
their accounting bases and calculations examined and reported on by
auditors or consultant accountants., Any financial advisor mentioned
in the document must also report on the forecasts. These reports must
be included in the document together with a consent to publish.3 5
The Panel has issued two Practice Notes on rule 16. Practice Note
4, first issued in June, 1970, requires among other things, that the forecasts be used no more than 60 days. Practice Note 6, first issued in June,
1971, goes into the position of accountants and financial advisors in
reporting on forecasts. While the forecasts and assumptions are to be
the responsibility of the Directors, neither the accountants nor the
advisors "should allow an assumption to be published which appears
to them to be unrealistic (or one to be omitted which appears to them
to be important) without commenting on it in their reports".3 6 The
Panel does not appear to wish to take a rigid approach to the form
37
of the forecast, the assumptions or the reports.
It is noteworthy that the Panel regards a forecast to have been
made, requiring full treatment, where any general language appears
as to future profits. No time limit is placed on the forecasts and many
go out as far as five years.
33 See LONDON PANEL ON TArEOVERS AND MERGERS, REPORT ON YEAR ENDED 31sT MARCH,
1970, 6-7. See also Grieves, English Profit Forecasts, REv. SEcumrImEs REGULATIONS, May 25,
1972, at 919-21.
34 Id.
35 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, February, 1972 Revision.
36 Practice Note 6, City Code, February 16, 1972 revision, para. 6.
87 However, certain practices have grown up. Apparently, it is common to indude
assumptions as to inflation, sales volume, sales price and costs. See Assumptions and Profits
Forecasts,THE ACCOUNerANTS MAGAZINE, January, 1972, at 13.
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The Panel reports as of March 31st of each year on the results of
its work. From May 1, 1969 through March 31, 1972, it has reviewed
173 cases of forecasts of which 122 were achieved within a 10% margin
of error and 16 were "not comparable with results." Of the 35 "fail38
ures", 26 were by offeree companies.
The British rules appear to work well in practice. They do not
have the force of law, but in the inimitable British fashion, are
cooperatively observed by the closely-knit financial community of the
City in a manner designed to insure speedy action.3 9 A noteworthy
feature is the careful follow-up by the Panel of actual results and
lengthy inquiry in cases where they are way out of line with forecasts.40
It is not clear to what extent the British forecasting practice could be
safely imported into the U.S. regulatory system. However, it is reassuring to know that results to date have not been a disaster.
Legal Problems- Allocating Responsibility
There is no question that the SEC has the power to require the
insertion of predictive statements in prospectuses 41 and proxy statements or tender offer literature.4 2 Further, it can regulate the form of
predictive material prepared by broker-dealers 43 and investment advisors." To a certain extent, it can control the degree to which this
material has the status of expert information under the 193345 and
31sr IARCHr, 1972 at 6.
39 Statement of Vivian Jennings, Takeover Bids (ABA Proceedings), 27 Bus. LAwYER
243, 253 (1971).
40 Statement of Robert A. Clark, Esq., id. at 269.
41 Securities Act of 1933, section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 7(g) (1971). The development of dearly
defined levels of "expertized" predictions in "distribution" and "corporate action" contexts
will go far to quiet the chronically troublesome problem of which rule lOb-5 disclosure
requirements apply to issuers "in registration" or soliciting proxies. See Securities Act
Release No. 5092, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
77,915 (Oct. 15,
1970); Securities Act Release No. 33-5180, supra note 3. See also Securities Act Release No.
3844, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan. SEc. L. REP.
3250-56 (Oct. 8, 1957); Securities Act Release No. 5009, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD. SEc. L. REP.
77,744
(Oct. 7, 1969). For an able discussion of the problem, see Gillis, A Disclosure Dilemma, 27
FINANCIAL ANYLYrs JourNAL 6 (1971). The heart of the difficulty is issuer contact with
analysts who allegedly come away with "inside" information. Once this process has been
legitimized, and analysts required to disclose their results, the problem should shrink to
the rather manageable question of how to handle honest difference of published opinion
among analysts. Presumably experience with the new rules would dictate the inclusion of
a summary of such differences in material going to investors in the "distribution" and
"corporate action" contexts.
42 § 14, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1971).
43 § 15A(b)(8) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-g(b)(8) (1971).
44 §§ 204, 206, Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-4, 80b-6 (1971). In
this connection it is interesting to note that the SEC will be moving more aggressively in
this area, since the exception for investment advisors solely to mutual funds was removed,
effective December 14, 1971. There are a number of technical Investment Company Act
issues raised by the proposals, but these are deemed beyond the scope of this article.
45 §§ 7, 11(a)(4), 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77k(a)(4) (1971).
38 LODNDON PANjEL, REPORT FOR YEAR ENDmn
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193446 Acts, so as to allocate the responsibilities in the manner above
described.
Naturally, a careful review will have to be undertaken of negative
pronouncements on predictions currently in effect 47 and of rules
relating to recommendations and reports in connection with distribu48
tions.
The Courts have been somewhat confused in applying disclosure
principles to prospectuses or proxy statements involving valuations or
projections. In the recent Chris-Craftcase 49 for example, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded a District
Court finding that stating the value of a securities package in an
exchange offer press release was not a violation of the 1933 Act. In the
Gamble Skogmo case, 50 the U.S. Court in the Eastern District of New
York found it a violation of the 1934 Act not to include in a merger
proxy an estimate of the fair market value of the assets of the acquired
company even though the defendant had been told by the SEC (and
the SEC argued in an amicus brief) that such inclusion would be misleading. Doubtless these confusions can be dispelled by clear SEC
leadership in developing rules for disclosure under the 1933 Act.
More troublesome questions arise with respect to rule lOb-5, the
enfant terrible of securities regulation newly upon us. Here we have a
body of "Federal corporate law" which the courts have developed
largely by themselves without significant rule-making direction by
the SEC.51 The big problem we have here is that the courts are starting
to develop their own notions of what, in the way of predictions, is a
"manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" under section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, or a "practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit" under rule lOb-5 and section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act. This has already complicated the "gun jumping"
52
problem.
To date, we have not had a full-dress treatment of predictions in
46 § 18(a) 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1971).
47 See Securities Act Release No. 5180, supra note 3 and text accompanying note

37,

24,013.
supra. See rule 14a-9 of the Commission's Proxy Rules, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
See also WHrAT REPORT at 17, 95. Stock exchange disclosure rules will also have to be examined such as THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY Giomn 103 (1970) and THE
NYSE COMPANY MANUAL A-18 to A-27 (1970).
48 See, e.g., Guide No. 26, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
3786.
49 Chris Craft Industries v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970); See also
Union Pacific Railroad v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill.
1964) (misleading to distribute investment banker's evaluation report in a proxy contest).

50 Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
51 See Bradford, Rule 10b-5, The Search for a Limiting Doctrine, 19 BUFFALO L. REV.

205 (1970).
52 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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court. Facts have been the main concern. The 1968 statement of Judge
Waterman in Texas Gulf Sulphur is probably good today, as far as
courts are concerned:
Nor is an insider obligated to confer upon outside investors the
benefit of his superior financial or other expert analysis by disclosing his educated guesses or predictions. The only regulatory objective is that access to material information be enjoyed equally, but
this objective requires nothing more than the disclosure of basic
facts so that outsiders may draw on their own evaluative expertise
in reaching their own investment decisions with knowledge equal
3
to that of the insiders.5
Judge Waterman recognized the inclusion of "lead indicator" or
probabilistic fact, in the regulatory scheme:
.. . thus, material facts include not only information disclosing
the earnings and distributions of a Company but also those facts
which affect the probable future of the Company .... 54
The SEC's ruling in the Merrill Lynch case 55 may represent a
different theory, in view of the careful use of the phrase "material
information" rather than "material fact". The case does involve
earnings projections. However, the gravamen of the case is clearly the
fact that the Douglas Aircraft Company was, in late June, 1966, about
to release to the press actual earnings for the six months ended May 31,
1966, considerably lower than the 94 cents per share reported for the
five months ended April 30, 1966. This fact alone would have caused a
market drop whether or not coupled with reduced earnings forecasts.
In the related Investor'sManagement5 case, the SEC stated:
...

in testing materiality, the importance of reliability in terms of

the underlying accuracy of the information wanes as that accorded
to the character of the information increases. Thus, a company's
own earnings results and own projections which are of manifest
53 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971). But see Spraygregen v. Livingston Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (Claim based on issuer's speech to N.Y. Society of Security Analysts, predicting earnings unreasonably, stated a good claim). See also Freed v. Szabo Foods, [1961-1964 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 91,317 (N.D. IM. Jan. 16, 1964) (proxy statement). Professor Loss states the law - and the problem - well. VI Loss, ScusrrEs REGULATION 3564-66
(2d ed., Supp., 1969).
54 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 889. The SEC has defined "materiality"
as "matters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed
before purchasing (1934 Act: "buying or selling") the security registered", 1933 Act rule
405(1); 1934 rule 12b-2(j).
55 Exchange Act Release No. 8459, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan. SEC. L. REP.
77,629 (February 25, 1968).
56 Investor's Management Co., Inc. AP file No. 3-1680, Initial decision, June 26, 1970.
See CCH Fan. SEC. L. REP. 77,832.
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importance to investment judgment fall nevertheless in the category of material information though subject to future judgment or
reconsideration. If, of course ...

information is so unreliable that

a reasonable person would refuse it credit, there would be no
reason to regard the information as material.
One certainly should have no quarrel with the basic thought here.
Issuers should and do have a duty to respond to forecasts going around
which are clearly out of line.5 7 However, there is a trap, as clearly
pointed out by these rule lOb-5 and related antifraud rulings. They
are tending to require issuers to affirmatively come forward with their
own forecasts, when in their own judgment such forecasts have become
"material" to investors. Yet when these forecasts are put out, they are
cause for later liability on grounds of unreasonableness if they are not
met.

Rule 1Ob-5 sanctions have their proper place in the regulatory
arsenal. However, I submit that they are far too heavy-handed a tool
for dealing with the fabric of delicate policy issues surrounding the
proper status of forecasts. A device which has to fumble with the
concepts of "scienter"' s , "reliance" 59 and "action"60 is far too unwieldy
a bull to let loose in this china shop.
61
One of many examples: in Milberg v. Western Pacific Railroad,
the Court (Croake, J.) denied the plaintiff's motion to establish a class
action against the defendant Railroad and Dow Jones and Company.
The plaintiff alleged a purchase of railroad shares on June 12, 1969
on the basis of a May 19, 1969 article in Barron'smagazine stating that
Railroad net for the June quarter "is expected to show some improvement" over net for the prior year. In fact, June quarter earnings
amounted only to 25 cents per share, as against 84 cents, and the
announcement then triggered a sharp drop in share prices causing the
plaintiff's loss. Plaintiff alleged either (1) that the article was based on
misleading information supplied by Railroad or, if not, (2) that the
article was written with a reckless disregard for the truth. In a stinging
57 See Address by R. Haack to N.Y. Bar Ass'n, "Corporate Responsibility to the Investing Public," Mar. 25, 1968, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. R.EP. 77,554;
NEw YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE ComreANY MANUAL, Section A2 (1970). See also Rule 473 re:

predictions in recommendations; West, Timely Disclosure; The View From 11 Wall Street,
24 S.W. LAW

J.

247 (1970); AmMEECAN STOCK EXCHANGE DxscLosuRE PoLICmES

§

403 (1970).

See also rule 484 re: predictions.
58 See Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah, 1970) modified
sub nom. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
59 See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969);
Marino v. Coburn Corp., 2 CCH Fan. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,959 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1971).
60 Hirsch v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
6151 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) app. denied, 433 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
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paragraph or two" Judge Croake dismissed the plaintiff's theory,
calling it, among other things, "a rather self-seeking attempt to infringe
63
upon defendant's First Amendment rights as well".
Decisions like the foregoing represent prime examples of the
inevitable heavy-handed trend of "Federal corporate law" to place
forecasting disclosure burdens on the wrong parties in the wrong way
in the wrong contexts,6" a tendency accelerated by the current debate
over the subject. Unless the SEC acts fairly rapidly to develop a comprehensive, carefully planned series of changes in its rules, it may find
that the courts have done the job for it, in a way too embarrassingly
final to alter.
Legal Problems-Liabilities
Who should be allowed to recover against whom in the case of an
improper forecast? The problem appears quite difficult under the initial
proposal; there, forecasts are unavoidably placed on the same liability
level as factual corporate information. A foretaste of the judicial contortions that will result can be found in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp.65 Here, a former shareholder of Reliance Insurance
Company was held entitled to recover from Leasco and three "inside"
directors (but not the investment bankers) for violation of the 1933
Act, section 11, in that Leasco had failed to include in its exchange
offer prospectus for Reliance shares an estimate of the probable value
of Reliance's excess reserves ("surplus surplus" in insurance parlance).
Information on these reserves could not accurately be obtained from
anyone other than Reliance; independent actuarial reports placed
them at between 580 and 5125 million. Experienced SEC counsel for
Leasco and its investment bankers both advised that the information in
hand was too speculative to pass the tests of accuracy required in a
propectus. Reliance was not, at first, cooperative on the subject and
exact information could not, at first, have been obtained from Reliance.
Nevertheless, the Court held that an estimate was a key element of
Leasco's interest in Reliance and was therefore "material" to investors.
at 282.
63 The Judge may not have been aware of the line of cases cited on this point by Judge
Waterman, in the Texas Gulf case, 446 F.2d at 1302 (2d Cir. 1971), to support his ruling
that "the First Amendment deals with the exchange of ideas and not with commercial
'factual' speech."
641 am not, of course, out to place the responsibility on BARRON'S in all cases like this.
I just think that the issues should not have been decided without a more penetrating recourse to the facts. New cases arise every day for which this approach may be dangerous
precedent. See Complaint, Foster v. National Systems Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,522 (CM) Cal. June 14, 1972).
65 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
62 51 F.R.D.
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Insiders could have obtained a reasonable estimate due to a sudden
change in Reliance's attitude two weeks before the registration statement became effective. Outsiders, such as the investment bankers,
were nevertheless entitled to rely on Leasco's steadfast representation
that Reliance was still hostile. Therefore, the outsiders had met the
"reasonable investigation" defense of section 11(b). Counts under the
1933 Act, sections 12 and 17, and 1934 Act, sections 10(b) and 14(e),
were dismissed as surplus to recovery. 60
While the facts of each case will be complicated, I think we can
see in Leasco the outline of things to come. Evaluative information will
be ruled "material" to investors if management can be said to have
considered it so at the time (with the benefit of hindsight). Insiders
will be held liable for failure to estimate properly; outsiders (including
experts) will be exonerated if the record shows that they made the
proper inquiries, regardless of any exercise of judgment. As a result,
the same old forces will prevail, predictive statements will be excessively
vague and elaborately footnoted and the "due diligence" inquiry even
more of a charade than it now is.
If, however, we make a firm rule requiring mandatory predictive
statements prepared by outside experts, the roles are reversed (as they
should be). Management knows that these statements have to be prepared in all cases. The outside expert is directly responsible for the
reasonableness of factual assumptions in predictive statements prepared
by him under the 1933 Act, section 11(a)(4); however, he has a "due
diligence" defense with respect to facts furnished him by the registrant
under section 1l(b)(3). Insiders have a similar defense under section
1I(b)(3) with respect to the judgmental element in the expert's certificate. As a result, we encourage a short, specific judgmental expert report
accompanied by reasonable, coherent factual assumptions. Liabilities
are directly related to functions performed, not to whimsical judicial
journeys along a paper trial.
Position of U.S. Accountants
Part of the picture is, of course, the current ferment in the U.S.
accounting profession over whether to adopt in this country the 1969
pronouncement of The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England
and Wales, stating that accountants may "verify that ... forecasts have
been properly computed from the underlying assumptions and data
and are presented on a consistent basis". 7 The U.S. accounting pro66 For a similar effect under the proxy rules, see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, 298 F.
Supp.7 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
6 In the cases of takeovers, reporting accountants must make a check as to reasonableness. See text accompanying notes
supra. See also ICA, AccouNTANTs REPoRTs

32-36,
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fession has not gone this far. The AICPA exerts control over the
situation chiefly through rule 2.04 of The Code of Professional Ethics"
and Opinion No. 10 which "interprets" the rule. While the Opinion
was somewhat relaxed in 1970, the general approach is to require any
"statement or analysis' with which a member "associates his name"
to set forth the source. of the information, major assumptions, the
"character of the work" done on it by the member and the degree
of responsibility he is taking. In addition a member's document associated with it must "clearly indicate that the member does not vouch
for the accuracy of the forecast". 0
Now, there is,
in my opinion, everything to be gained by dearly
separating the function of reporting on past operations and passing on
the reasonableness of future forecasts. There is nothing wrong with
trying to develop a method for achieving continuity of accounting
treatment of predicted results. However, if this involves a company's
independent public accountant, he will inevitably be forced to choose
between justifying past projections or reporting current earnings properly o Furthermore, at least one eminent member of the profession
has pointed out that the performance of services by independent public
accountants in connection with forecasts will only accelerate the deplorable current trend away from professional independent fact verification towards a biased, unprofessional involvement with clients'
business affairs.n
Forcing responsibility on accountants for the accuracy of forecasts
would appear to be undesirable if more appropriate kinds of independent experts can be found to do as thorough a job.
Will Analysts Give Up Their Crystal Ball?
Ominous portents for securities analysts lurk in Merrill Lynch72
and Investor's Management.7 ' Like it or not, the gauntlet has been
PsRM FOASr 7 (July, 169). For an arument in favor of crdW forecastin& see
Daily, supra note 2. The author makes the interesting proposal that forecasts should be
AS

allowed if they are rmaterial," L., if the company has demonstrated reasonable accuracy
In the put a shown by its record. Contra, Harvey Kapnrck, supra note 15. See also Will.
inogam,Smith &-Taylor, wpra note 2.

4Rule 2.04 reads as follows:
A member or associate shall not permit his name to be used in conjunction with
any foremst of the results of future transactions in a manner which may lead to
the belief that the member or associate vouches for the accuracy of the forecast.
40 The AICPA has put its semiofcial stamp on a further gloss of the text. Se Beelda,
Ptfvting on Forecasts of Future Devlopments, 150 JouaN or Acooum'=W 54 (1970).

10 See Statement by Sprag, Diggins ' Ireland, supra note 32, at 15; Kapnick, supra
note 15, at 9-15.
u Ka=&k. sufra note 15, at 11.

" Exchange Act Release No. 8459, supranote s5.
" Z, flom04Qi Tramfea Binder] CCII En. SMc L. REP.

77.832 (June 26, 1970).
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thrown down. Odors of "insider privilege" fill the air when analyst
meetings are discussed.7 4 Yet in this uncomfortable situation the analyst
community has for a brief time a big opportunity to move to new
levels of professional stature.
If the original proposal is implemented, rules allowing issuers to
provide their own forecasts may well be accompanied by rules foreclosing analysts from the real or imagined "inside track" to material
corporate information. The investment advisory community can, in
that event, expect its operations to be constricted by a stiff new set of
rules and to bear for some time a faint onus of shady practice. These
developments would be indeed regrettable.
Responsible members of the analyst community can counter these
developments now by stepping forward to support an alternate proposal
similar to those here advocated. This strategy will involve much hard
work developing a body of standards. Nevertheless, it will successfully
preserve hard-won professional freedoms and materially aid the cause
of investor confidence which is the rational operative of our securities
markets.
Efforts to step forward with a comprehensive program for professional forecasting will have other positive benefits. After ten years
of debate over the methodology of forecasting, academics still can not,
as a whole, present the profession with a coherent body of theory
75
linking earnings variability with investment returns on equities.
Most practitioners, by and large, still use the old tried and untrue 76
method of relating predicted or "normalized" earnings to a predicted
or "normalized" P/E ratio77 Developing a regular data base comparing
professional predictions with reported results over time can only help
to increase the precision of academic forecast techniques and their
attractiveness to the average analyst. 78
7 9 liaOne certainly is aware of the dangers involved. BarChris
bilities are not easily faced by professionals. On the other hand, the
rewards are probably going to be greater, in the long run, for the
profession as a whole.
74 See Editorial, 27 FINANCIAL ANALYSrs J. 11 (1971). See also Backer, supra note 2.
75 See Keenan, supra note 12.
76W. Kent and J. Lewison, Why You Lost - Wall Street's Cultural Hangups, 27
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 33 (1971).
77 R. Bing, Survey of Practitioners'Stock Evaluation Methods, 27 FINANCIAL ANALYsrs

J. 55 (1971).

78 "The critical dependence of share prices on expectational variables has proved to
be a major obstacle for empirical investigators. Since only historical data have been available to most researchers, it has been difficult to isolate the true effect of the various variables affecting stock prices." Malkiel & Cragg, supra note 12, at 603. See also Daily, supra
note 2 (suggesting a system for evaluating forecasting accuracy).
79 Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp, 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

1972]

NEW GAME IN FORECASTING

One can sense these evaluations at work. The Second Seaview
Symposium 0 on financial reporting in part sponsored by the Financial
Analysts Federation concerned itself at length with published forecasts.
The Federation appears to be cautiously developing a series of positions
on forecasting which can be accepted by significant elements of the
financial community. For example, it generally supports the SEC
position on requiring cash budget statement in new issue prospectuses. 8 '
One is encouraged by these and other efforts to bolster self-regulation.
Will the Public Benefit?
Every good regulatory system should achieve, through planned
cooperation, maximum effect with minimum wasted effort. There is
no reason to quarrel with our basic disclosure system; over the years it
82
has worked "as advertised" to improve the quality of public finance.
In fact it has worked so remarkably well that we should undertake
fundamental changes with extreme care, lest valuable relationships
be buried or distorted to our regret.
Something must be done about predictive securities analysis.
Institutionalization of our markets, complexity and rapidity of reporting, now demand a decisive regulatory act. If false steps are taken they
can shake very fundamental relationships. Here, a procedural solution
is suggested which should preserve the best features of the old while
accommodating the new. If it works, the public can only continue to
benefit.
APrPENx A
FACTORS INVOLVED IN REGULATING THE FLOW
OF INFORMATION IN SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS
I

Categoriesof Information Involved

A. Subject Matter
- "Basic" fact directly/indirectly involving the Issuer's operations/market price
of security.
- "Ultimate" or "condusory" fact directly/indirectly involving the Issuer's operations/market price of security.
-"Predictive" data, e.g., prediction as to future "basic" or "ultimate" fact,
directly/indirectly involving the Issuer's operations/market price of security.

NOTE: "Predictive" data, will always carry with it a "probability" factor,
express or implied.
B. Authoritative Weight
-Official

pronouncement by regulatory authority.

- "Expertized" information.
Consensus information.
-Other.
-

80 Reported by J. Burton, Ethics in Corporate Financial Disclosure, 28 FINANCIAL

ANALYSTS J. 49 (1972). The Symposium brought together members of leading associations
in the accounting, legal and analyst professions, the SEC and NYSE.
81 See note 18 supra.
82 Irwin Friend, Broad Implications of the SEC Special Study, 21 JouRNAL oF FINAN E

324 (1966).
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C. Presentation Emphasis
- Immediately significant.
-Significant but not immediately.
- Not of great significance.
D. Desired Destination
-

Nonpublic.

-Official
-Selective
-Broadest

filing or report.
public distribution.
public distribution.

E. Medium
- Research or other private report or statement.
- Report other legal document required to be filed by law.
- Informal telephone or oral presentation or statement.
-Prospectus,
proxy statement or similar widespread selling document.
-Press
release, news story or similar public announcement.
H Types of Decisions To Be Made in Response To The Information
A. Decisionmaker
- Fiduciary institution or individual.
- Professional investment manager, institution or individual.
- Private investment institution or individual.
- Public investment institution.
-

Broker.

B. Investor's Objective On The Risk/Reward Curve
-Defensive,
e.g., saving, tax, hedge, etc.
-

Long term return.

-Trading
-

return.

Control.

C. Investor's Objective As To Portfolio Insertion
- Diversified/concentrated.
- 100%o owned/levered.
D. Investor's Objective(s) as to Nature of Return
- Appreciation in traded value.
- Appreciation in "appraised" value (e.g., control situation or mutual fund).
-Income

stream.

E. Investor's Objective as to Timing
-

III

Increasing position.
Decreasing position.
Voting.

Context in Which Flow of Information Affects Decisions
A. Formal Structure of Market for Security
-Listed existing/new security.
-OTC existing/new security.
- Untraded private transaction.
B. Liquidity of Potential Transaction
- Size of "float" and trend/cycle effects.
- Relative size of position involved.
C. Objective of Person(s) Disseminating the Information
- Obtaining purchase or sale of security.
- Obtaining vote of security holder.
-Compliance
with disclosure or other requirement.
-Response

to inquiry.

D. Effect of Flow on Decision
- A proximate cause of decision.
-A
necessary cause of decision.
-A
factor bearing on decision.
E. Organizational Process of Decision
- Individual/Investment Committee.
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Self-researched/advised.
In-house/contracted for.
F. Element(s) of Decision Affected
-Assessment of future economic conditions in issuer's market.
-Assessment of issuer's future position in markets.
- Assessment of issuer's future earnings, cash flow or financial position.
-Determination of multiple, discount or other factors to be used to reach estimate
of future value.
-Estimate of time in which future value will be reached.
-Estimate of relative probability of reaching value in time allotted.
-Assessment
of desirability of present action in the light of expected short term
market movements for total market, group and/or particular security.
-

